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PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER:
THE REACH OF SECTION 510 OF ERISA
Adam B. Gartner*
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) to ensure the protection of private employee benefits. In doing so,
Congress created uniform national standards for the administration of
private employee benefit plans. Section 510 of ERISA affords some
protection to whistleblowers who report ERISA violations. There is
uncertainty, however, about whether section 510 protects a whistleblower
who complains directly to his or her employer, or whether protection is
limited to an individual who makes a report externally. Some circuit courts
have held that section 510 protects all ERISA whistleblowers, while others
have held that section 510’s protections are more limited. This Note
considers the history of ERISA and of whistleblower laws, addresses the
circuit split over the reach of section 510’s whistleblower protection
provisions, and proposes an interpretation of section 510 that would
provide broad protection to ERISA whistleblowers.
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INTRODUCTION
Leslie Boran was the controller of the Royal Poinciana Golf Club in
Naples, Florida. 1 In early 2010, she alerted the Club’s board of trustees that
they were violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA). 2 She demanded that they correct the violations and report them
to the government. 3 Specifically, Boran told the trustees that the
company’s 401(k) plan was wrongfully charging employees an
administrative fee and that the Club was wrongfully failing to consider
holiday bonuses as income to be matched under the 401(k) plan.4 In March
2010, Boran returned from vacation to present the annual financial report at
the Club’s board meeting. 5 Before she had a chance to present the report,
Boran was arrested for trespassing and thrown in jail. 6 The Club had fired
Boran while she was on vacation and barred her from the premises.7 Boran

1. Aisling Swift, Naples CPA Contends Blowing Whistle Got Her Fired, NAPLES DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 21, 2010, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2010/mar/21/naples-cpa-contendsblowing-whistle-got-her-fired.
2. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461
(2006 & Supp. III 2009) and scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
3. Swift, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. The club claimed that Boran resigned on February 22, 2010, and was not
actually fired. Id. Boran disputed this claim. Id.
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asserted that she was fired because she reported the alleged ERISA
violations to the trustees.8
Private employee benefit funds, which control trillions of dollars in
assets, 9 have not been immune to corruption. The Teamsters’ Central
States Pension Fund is still under federal oversight due to corruption and
fraud in the 1960s and 1970s. 10 More recently, in 2009, a benefits
administrator for the Sandhogs Union in New York City was charged with
embezzling $42 million from the Union’s benefit funds over a seven-year
period. 11
What recourse would Boran, or any employee who discovered ongoing
violations, have if he or she were terminated for internally reporting ERISA
violations? The answer is not clear based on the current state of ERISA
case law.
Passed by Congress in 1974, ERISA drastically altered the relationship
between the federal government and private employee benefit plans and
turned the regulation of private employee benefit plans into an exclusively
federal matter. 12 ERISA is also considered one of the most complicated
and confusing federal statutes to navigate, with many sections still being
judicially interpreted today. 13
Still under consideration is section 510 of ERISA. 14 Section 510 protects
individuals from employer retaliation for certain activities.15 One such
activity that section 510 protects is whistleblowing. 16 A “whistleblower” is
an individual who seeks to change current practices by revealing
The protection of
information about the behavior or practices.17
whistleblowers is considered vital to a “democratic, free enterprise
system.” 18 Some whistleblowers have received national attention for their
acts, such as in 2002, when Time Magazine named “the Whistleblowers” as

8. Id.
9. See EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ASSETS IN QUALIFIED RETIREMENT P LANS, 1985–
2002: REVISED, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0904fact.pdf.
10. See Mary Williams Walsh, Teamsters Find Pensions at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2004, at A1.
11. Russ Buettner, Woman Stole from Union, Charges Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at
A32.
12. See Dennis K. Schaeffer, Comment, Insuring the Protection of ERISA Plan
Participants: ERISA Preemption and the Federal Government’s Duty to Regulate SelfInsured Health Plans, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1085, 1090 (1999).
13. See, e.g., Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010) (noting that the facts
in most ERISA matters are “exceedingly complicated”); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (ERISA is an “enormously complex and detailed statute”); Nachman
Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980) (describing ERISA as a
“comprehensive and reticulated statute”).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). The text of this Note will refer to ERISA provisions by
the original section number within ERISA, as opposed to the section number in the United
States Code.
15. See id.; see also infra Part I.C (describing the protections that section 510 provides).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
17. MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 15 (1992).
18. See Winters v. Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 730 (Tex. 1990)
(Doggett, J., concurring).
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Despite this national admiration for
its Persons of the Year. 19
whistleblowers, there is still much confusion about whether section 510
applies to internal complaints made by an employee to an employer, or
whether it applies only to external complaints made to an outside agency. 20
This Note addresses the unresolved circuit split over the reach of
ERISA’s whistleblower protection provisions. Part I of this Note provides
an overview of the history of ERISA and of whistleblower laws generally,
and explains some of the key provisions of ERISA. Part II details the
circuit split over whether section 510 of ERISA applies to internal
whistleblower complaints. Part III endorses an interpretation of section 510
that would provide the greatest level of protection for ERISA
whistleblowers.
I. BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS
An appreciation of the basic framework of ERISA and its goals is
necessary to understand how courts interpret ERISA. First, this part
chronicles ERISA’s passage and details key elements of ERISA’s
regulatory framework, specifically its fiduciary protection policies, its civil
enforcement regime, and ERISA preemption. Next, this part provides
background on whistleblower protection laws, and contrasts state and
federal whistleblower protection. Finally, this part gives a detailed
overview of section 510 of ERISA.
A. An Overview of ERISA
This section first provides a summary of the events leading to ERISA’s
passage. Next, it describes the type of employee benefit plans to which
ERISA applies. Then, this section explains three important parts of ERISA:
fiduciary responsibility, civil enforcement, and preemption.
1. The Road to ERISA
The Studebaker Corporation’s closure of its automotive plant in South
Bend, Indiana in December 1963 was perhaps the major impetus for the
passage of ERISA. 21 When the plant closed, Studebaker’s pension plan
lacked the funds to pay the workers their full pensions.22 In the years
following the Studebaker plan’s failure, both Congress and the public
Some
questioned why the Studebaker plan was underfunded. 23
19. See generally Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec.
30, 2002–Jan. 6, 2003, at 30.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:
A POLITICAL HISTORY 51 (2004); Kermit J. Berylson, ERISA Revolutionizes the Pension
Field, CPA J., Apr. 1977, at 23, 23; Philip Shabecoff, Washington and Business: ERISA—
Still 5-Letter Word for Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1977, at D1.
22. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 51; Landon Wade Magnusson, Note, Golden Gate and
the Ninth Circuit’s Threat to ERISA’s Uniformity and Jurisprudence, 2010 BYU L. REV.
167, 168.
23. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 51.
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commentators claimed that company officials misused the pension plan’s
funds, 24 while others, such as Congressman John Dent of Pennsylvania,
claimed that the “company had redirected its pension funds toward new
acquisitions.” 25 In actuality, the plan failed because of its funding structure,
as opposed to any nefarious scheme. 26 Studebaker and the United Auto
Workers had agreed to a pension plan funding formula that exposed
younger employees to greater risk that the pension plan would default.27
Whatever the reason behind the Studebaker plan’s failure, the reality was
that the workers lost their pensions. 28
Congress kept the Studebaker plan’s failure in mind over the ensuing
decade as it proceeded to draft ERISA. 29 After years of debate in Congress,
on September 2, 1974—Labor Day—President Gerald Ford signed ERISA
into law. 30 Prior to ERISA, the determination of the amount of risk in
private pension plans was typically left to the contracting parties.31 ERISA
completely changed this by making it federal policy to provide security for
private pension plans. 32
ERISA’s main goals were promoting proper management of benefit fund
finances, preventing mismanagement and abuse, protecting participants’
pensions, preserving substantial employer control over plan sponsorship,
and creating uniform national standards for the governance of private
pension plans. 33 While ERISA did not require private companies to
provide benefits, it did create a framework to help provide protection to
private benefit plan participants.34
2. What ERISA Covers
ERISA applies to pension benefit plans and welfare benefit plans.35
Pension benefit plans are plans that defer income until retirement or
termination of employment, or provide retirement income to participants.36

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 51–52.
27. Id. at 52–53.
28. See id. at 51–53.
29. See, e.g., Robert E. Dallos, Pension Funds: Congress to Study Tighter Regulations,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1966, at 63; Michael C. Jensen, Pension Revisions Expected in 1972,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1971, at 72; Michael C. Jensen, Pensions Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 1971, at F1; David E. Rosenbaum, Pension Reform Measure Voted by House, 375 to 4,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1974, at 1.
30. See Bruce F. Spencer, 1966–1975: The Decade of ERISA, EMP. BENEFIT PLAN REV.,
Mar. 1996, at 54, 54–55.
31. WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 3.
32. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90–91 (1983); WOOTEN, supra note
21, at 3.
33. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 14
(2010); WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 4–5.
34. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91.
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 5.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 6.

240

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

Welfare benefit plans include certain employee health benefit, life
insurance, and disability insurance plans.37
ERISA does not require employers to provide any specific employee
benefits; rather, it sets standards that plan sponsors must follow when they
choose to provide benefits. 38 ERISA provides guidelines for, among other
things, vesting, 39 plan funding, 40 and fiduciary standards. 41
ERISA applies to two main types of pension benefit plans: defined
contribution plans and defined benefit plans.42 A defined contribution plan
is a plan in which the employer and/or participant contributes to an
individual account on the participant’s behalf.43 The contributions are then
invested on the participant’s behalf, and the participant eventually receives
the balance in the account.44 Some examples of defined contribution plans
are 401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, employee stock ownership plans, and profitA defined benefit plan is any type of deferred
sharing plans. 45
compensation program that is not a defined contribution plan.46 With a
defined benefit plan, a participant is guaranteed certain benefits at
retirement based on a set formula. 47 Factors that can influence the ultimate
level of benefits include length of service, compensation level, and age.48
The employer is obligated to pay benefits at the promised level—if the plan
lacks the funds, the employer must make up the difference.49
ERISA also created the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)
to insure defined benefit pension plans.50 After the Studebaker failure,
union leaders pushed for a “pension reinsurance” program to protect
workers if a fund defaulted on its obligations. 51 The PBGC is intended to
ensure that defined benefit pension plans are able to pay out retirement

37. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 5–6.
38. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 18–19.
39. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
40. See id. §§ 1082–1085 (Supp. III 2009).
41. See id. § 1104 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
42. See id. § 1002(34)–(35) (2006); see also WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7.
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34); see also WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Frequently
Asked Questions About Pension Plans and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_compliance_pension.html [hereinafter FAQs About
ERISA] (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
44. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43.
45. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7–8; FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35); WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; FAQs About ERISA, supra
note 43.
47. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined
Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 455 (2004); FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43.
48. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Zelinsky, supra note 47, at 456.
49. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 7; Zelinsky, supra note 47, at 456.
50. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., A PREDICTABLE, SECURE PENSION FOR LIFE:
DEFINED BENEFIT PENSIONS (2000), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/
A_Predictable_Secure_Pension_for_Life.pdf.
51. See WOOTEN, supra note 21, at 52; Bernard Shakin, Tough on Fiduciaries,
BARRON’S NAT’L BUS. & FIN. WKLY., Dec. 16, 1974, at 11; see also supra Part I.A.1
(discussing the Studebaker failure).
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benefits when they come due. 52 The PBGC monitors the health of defined
benefit pension funds, and, in the event a plan terminates without sufficient
funds to pay all benefits, the PBGC pays out pension benefits to
participants. 53 The PBGC only insures defined benefit funds; it does not
insure defined contribution funds. 54 Employers who sponsor defined
benefit plans pay premiums at a rate set by Congress to fund the PBGC,55
and the PBGC also maintains a $100 million line of credit with the United
States Treasury. 56 The PBGC does not receive any taxpayer funds, but
recent concerns over pension plan funding have led to concerns that
taxpayer support, or a “taxpayer bailout,” may be necessary. 57
3. ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility
This section describes ERISA’s fiduciary conduct standards. As will be
discussed in Part II of this Note, ERISA’s fiduciary conduct standards play
an important role in determining the reach of section 510. 58
ERISA requires that benefit plans identify “one or more named
fiduciaries who . . . shall have authority to control and manage the operation
and administration of the plan.” 59 ERISA defines a fiduciary not just
formally but also functionally 60: an individual may become a fiduciary by
being named a fiduciary, or based on functions the individual performs with
respect to the plan. 61 A person who exercises “discretionary control or
authority over the plan’s management, administration, or assets” becomes a
fiduciary by virtue of performing those functions. 62

52. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006); Michael Barbanell Landres, Note, Smoke, Mirrors,
and ERISA: The False Illusion of Retirement Income Security, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1169,
1182–83 (2007); Major Provisions of the Pension Bill Signed by Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3,
1974, at 24.
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 1302; General FAQs About PBGC, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP.,
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/faq/pg/general-faqs-about-pbgc.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2011).
54. See General FAQs About PBGC, supra note 53.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
56. Id. § 1305 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Javier Hernandez, Bill Would Extend Time to Fund Pension Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2009, at B4; Editorial, The UAW’s Defined Benefactor, WALL ST. J., July
25–26, 2009, at A12; Alex J. Pollock, The Next Big Bailout?, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2006,
12:00
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/19/
AR2006041901967.html.
58. See infra Part II.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). A “named fiduciary” is either a fiduciary who is named in
the plan document, or is identified as a fiduciary by the employer organization. Id.
§ 1102(a)(2).
60. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); see also ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW 12–13 (Susan P. Serota & Frederick A. Brodie eds., 2d ed. 2006);
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 111–13.
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 12–14;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 111–13.
62. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); ERISA FIDUCIARY
LAW, supra note 60, at 12–13; WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 112.
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Section 404(a) of ERISA lays out the responsibilities of an ERISA
fiduciary. 63 A fiduciary must act “solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries” of the plan.64 Inherent in this requirement are the four
main responsibilities of the fiduciary. 65 First, the fiduciary must act “for
the exclusive purpose” of providing benefits to plan participants and
beneficiaries and of defraying reasonable expenses in administering the
plan. 66 Second, a fiduciary must act “with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting
in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct
of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.” 67 Third, the
fiduciary must ensure that the plan’s assets are sufficiently diversified to
minimize the risk of loss. 68 Fourth, a fiduciary must act in accordance with
the plan document and other plan governing instruments, as long as they do
not violate ERISA. 69
A fiduciary has the duty to review plan investments and plan actions to
ensure that they comply with the plan document and with ERISA’s
regulations. 70 Whether or not a fiduciary fulfills this duty is judged based
upon how someone with expertise in an area would act, and a fiduciary’s
lack of expertise in an area will not exempt a fiduciary from the
requirements set forth in section 404(a). 71
In certain instances an ERISA fiduciary may have a duty to disclose
information to plan participants. 72 In Varity Corp. v. Howe, 73 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that lying to participants is “inconsistent with the duty
of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.” 74 Additionally, some circuit courts have
held that a fiduciary has a duty to disclose if a plan is “serious[ly]
consider[ing]” benefit plan changes that could or might affect participants’
retirement decisions.75 Statutorily, ERISA plan administrators must furnish
63.
64.
65.
66.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
Id. § 1104(a)(1).
See id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(D).
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 31–32;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 32;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 32;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 33;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 120–21.
70. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104.
71. See, e.g., Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489–90 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
obtaining an independent appraisal does not satisfy a fiduciary’s duty); Fink v. Nat’l Sav. &
Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“A fiduciary’s independent investigation of
the merits of a particular investment is at the heart of the prudent person standard.”);
Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a fiduciary may
seek advice from experts to fulfill section 404(a)’s prudence standards); see also ERISA
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 237–38.
72. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 772–73.
73. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
74. Id. at 506.
75. See Fischer v. Phila. Electric Co., 96 F.3d 1533, 1539 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997); Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d
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to participants and beneficiaries summary plan descriptions, annual reports,
and similar documents,76 and ERISA fiduciaries may have a duty to correct
any misstatement in these reports.77
Employee benefit plans may not exempt a fiduciary from the statutorily
required responsibilities. 78 Fiduciaries who fail to fulfill their fiduciary
responsibilities may be held personally liable under section 409 of ERISA
for losses that result from the violation. 79
Where there are multiple plan fiduciaries, a fiduciary may be held liable
under section 405 of ERISA for another fiduciary’s breach of duty. 80 The
fiduciary may also be held liable if the fiduciary “participates knowingly in,
or knowingly undertakes to conceal, an act or omission of such other
fiduciary, knowing such act or omission is a breach.” 81 Fiduciaries who
have actual knowledge that they are assisting co-fiduciaries in violating
ERISA have a duty to stop providing assistance and disclose the
violations. 82
Fiduciaries may also be held liable if they have “knowledge of” a cofiduciary’s breach and fail to take reasonable steps to remedy the breach.83
The level of knowledge necessary to trigger the obligation varies, as some
courts have held that actual knowledge is necessary to trigger the
obligation, 84 while at least one court has held that constructive knowledge
is sufficient. 85
Finally, fiduciaries can be held liable if their failure to fulfill their
fiduciary duties under section 404(a) enables co-fiduciaries to breach their
own fiduciary duties. 86 In such a case, the fiduciary need have no actual
1515, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997); cf. Bins v. Exxon Co. U.S.A., 189 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that “serious consideration” is one of the factors to be considered when
determining if disclosure is required); Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 122 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“serious consideration” is not the “talismanic” requirement in determining if
disclosure is required).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2006); see also Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Litigation Under the Guise of
ERISA?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497, 513–14 (2009).
77. See, e.g., McAuley v. IBM Corp., 165 F.3d 1038, 1046 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 789–90.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a); see WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 121.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a); see ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 31.
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
81. Id. § 1105(a)(1).
82. See id.; see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 377.
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(3).
84. See, e.g., Silverman v. Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 138 F.3d 98, 103–04 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that a fiduciary can be held liable only if he had actual knowledge of a cofiduciary’s breach); Lee v. Burkhart, 991 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a
fiduciary must have actual knowledge of a co-fiduciary’s breach); Donovan v. Cunningham,
716 F.2d 1455, 1475 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that section 405 “does not impose vicarious
liability” and instead requires actual knowledge by the fiduciary).
85. See, e.g., In re Dynegy, Inc. ERISA Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 861, 905–06 (S.D. Tex.
2004); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 378.
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (providing that a fiduciary is liable for another
fiduciary’s breach if the fiduciary’s failure to comply with section 404(a) has “enabled such
other fiduciary to commit a breach”); see also supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text
(discussing the ERISA fiduciary responsibility standards).
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knowledge of the co-fiduciary’s breach; it is sufficient that the co-fiduciary
was able to commit the ERISA violation because the fiduciary failed to
follow section 404(a). 87
4. Civil Enforcement of ERISA
Section 502(a) of ERISA 88 provides the primary means of civil
enforcement of ERISA. This section discusses the three main options that
section 502(a) provides. 89
The first option authorizes a participant or beneficiary to bring an action
under section 502(a)(1)(B) for “benefits due” under the plan, to enforce
rights under the plan, or to clarify an individual’s rights to future benefits
under the plan. 90 This option is the “workhorse of ERISA remedy law” that
participants routinely use when they believe they have been wrongfully
denied plan benefits. 91
The second option authorizes the Secretary of Labor, a participant, a
beneficiary, or a fiduciary to bring an action under section 502(a)(2) against
a fiduciary for breach of fiduciary duty as set forth in section 409 of
ERISA. 92 In the case of a defined benefit plan, recovery under section
502(a)(2) is limited to relief sought on behalf of the plan, as opposed to
relief on behalf of the individual.93 In the case of a defined contribution
plan, such as a 401(k) plan, individual recovery is permitted where a
fiduciary’s breach impairs the assets in the individual’s account.94
The third option for bringing a civil action is found in section 502(a)(3),
which permits a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring an action to
“enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter
or the terms of the plan” or to “obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i)
to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter
or the terms of the plan.” 95 This option has been viewed as a “catchall”
87. See In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 581
(S.D. Tex. 2003); see also ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 60, at 378.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
89. Section 502(a) contains ten subsections detailing who can bring a civil action and
under what circumstances a civil action may be brought. See id. This Note will focus only
on the three primary means available to participants, beneficiaries, and fiduciaries. See id.
§ 1132(a)(1)–(3).
90. See id. § 1132(a)(1)(B); see also JAYNE E. ZANGLEIN & SUSAN J. STABILE, ERISA
LITIGATION 107 (3d ed. 2008).
91. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s
Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1334 (2003);
see also Regina L. Readling, Comment, Rethinking “The Plan”: Why ERISA Section
502(a)(2) Should Allow Recovery to Individual Defined Contribution Pension Plan
Accounts, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 315, 329 (2008).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text
(describing fiduciary liability under section 409 of ERISA).
93. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985); Susan Harthill, A
Square Peg in a Round Hole: Whether Traditional Trust Law “Make-Whole” Relief Is
Available Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 61 OKLA. L. REV. 721, 738 (2008).
94. See LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg, & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008); see also
ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 108–09.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
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provision, providing protection in instances not covered by sections
502(a)(1) or (2). 96 The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, determined that
“appropriate equitable relief” available under section 502(a)(3) is limited to
the type of relief “typically available” in courts of equity. 97
Courts generally treat the list of plaintiffs provided in section 502(a) as
exhaustive. 98 Thus, an individual or entity not specifically included within
section 502(a) may not bring a civil action for violations of ERISA. 99
5. ERISA Preemption
Section 514 of ERISA 100 provides that ERISA preempts state laws, and
provides that ERISA “shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any” benefit plan covered by ERISA.101
Congress included preemption to make regulation of benefit funds
“exclusively a federal concern,” 102 and to ensure that ERISA plans do not
have to deal with “conflicting or inconsistent” state laws. 103 Congressman
John Dent, one of ERISA’s architects, called section 514 ERISA’s
“crowning achievement.” 104 Courts have struggled to determine when
ERISA preempts a state law, however. 105
In early section 514 preemption cases, the Supreme Court broadly
interpreted the doctrine of ERISA preemption.106 The Court held that a
state law “relates to” an ERISA plan if it makes “reference to” or has a
“connection with” an ERISA plan. 107 Thus, the Court found that ERISA
preempts state laws that specifically referenced plans governed by

96. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra
note 90, at 110; Langbein, supra note 91, at 1335.
97. See Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 361–62 (2006); GreatWest Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Mertens v. Hewitt
Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993); see also Langbein, supra note 91, at 1350.
98. See, e.g., Leuthner v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ne. Pa., 454 F.3d 120, 125 (3d
Cir. 2006); Felix v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 387 F.3d 1146, 1160 n.14 (10th Cir. 2004); see also
WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 157; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 218–19.
99. WIEDENBECK, supra note 33, at 157; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90,
at 218–19.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
101. Id. § 1144(a). “‘State law’ includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law . . . .” Id. § 1144(c)(1). Preemption does not apply to
any state law that regulates “insurance, banking, or securities.” Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
102. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981).
103. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,933 (1974) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams, Jr.).
104. Id. at 29,197 (statement of Rep. John H. Dent).
105. At least one judge has likened the task of understanding ERISA preemption to a
“descent into a Serbonian bog.” DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3d
Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., concurring).
106. See ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 122; Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No
Remedy: Intersectionality and the Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 137 (2009);
Elizabeth Barnidge, Comment, What Lies Ahead for ERISA’s Preemption Doctrine After a
Judicial Call to Action Is Issued in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 125, 135
(2006).
107. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
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ERISA, 108 and preempts state law even if the law is consistent with
ERISA’s purpose. 109 Additionally, the Court held that ERISA preempted a
state law claim where the plaintiff’s claim relies on the existence of, and
participation in, an ERISA plan.110
In recent years, the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of section 514
ERISA preemption. 111 The change began in New York State Conference of
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 112 where the
Court shifted from the earlier broad view to one based “on the ‘assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.’” 113 In Travelers, the Court discussed the policy reasons behind
preemption—to allow for national uniformity of administration of
employee benefit plans—and determined that the state law at issue was not
preempted because it did not interfere with this purpose. 114 In cases after
Travelers, the Court continued to determine whether ERISA preempts a
state law by considering whether the state law undermines ERISA’s policy
objectives. 115
Because preemption is a defense, and federal court subject matter
jurisdiction is based on the well-pleaded complaint rule, ERISA section
514’s preemption of a state law does not automatically confer federal court
subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of action.116 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has determined that Congress’s goal of “creating a
comprehensive statute for the regulation of employee benefit plans” would
be “completely undermined” if participants and beneficiaries could obtain

108. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988)
(holding that a Georgia state law that specifically made reference to an ERISA plan was
preempted by ERISA).
109. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739.
110. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139–40 (1990) (holding that
ERISA preempted a state law wrongful discharge claim where the reason for the discharge
was to avoid making contributions to the pension fund).
111. ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 122; Secunda, supra note 106, at 139–41;
Barnidge, supra note 106, at 135.
112. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
113. Id. at 655 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see
also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 132.
114. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657–58.
115. See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1997) (holding that a state law was
preempted because it undermined ERISA by changing ERISA’s “structure and balance”);
De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997) (holding
that ERISA did not preempt a state tax on hospitals even though hospitals owned or operated
by ERISA plans would need to pay the tax); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 324–25 (1997) (holding that ERISA did not
preempt a state law regulating apprenticeship programs because the state law did not apply
specifically to ERISA plans); see also ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 132–36;
Secunda, supra note 106, at 139–41.
116. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207–08 (2004); Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–65 (1987); see also Robert A. Cohen, Note, Understanding
Preemption Removal Under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 578, 596–97 (1997).
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remedies under state law that ERISA section 502(a) does not provide. 117
Thus, any state law cause of action that “duplicates, supplements, or
supplants” the remedies that section 502(a) provides is considered a federal
claim and is completely preempted by ERISA. 118
B. An Overview of Whistleblower Laws
This section provides a general overview of whistleblower protection
laws. This section first describes the creation of the modern form of
whistleblower protection. Next, it explains the relationship between federal
and state whistleblower protection, as well as differences between various
state whistleblower protection laws. Finally, it compares the different
methods whistleblowers can use to seek redress for violations.
1. The Creation of Whistleblower Laws
Up until the 1960s, employees were not provided any protection from
termination for exposing their employers’ improper practices. 119 This was
justified by a strong belief in the doctrine of at-will employment. 120 Horace
Gray Wood is credited with creating this doctrine in 1877. 121 Under the atwill employment doctrine, all hiring is presumed to be “at-will” and can be
terminated at any time by either party. 122 This doctrine was based on the
premise that employers needed flexibility in hiring, and that employees
should be free to choose employment as they wished. 123 Various courts
throughout the country adopted the rule after Wood espoused it in 1877.124
The at-will employment doctrine came under attack in the middle part of
the twentieth century over concerns that employers were taking advantage
of employees. 125 At the same time, the importance of whistleblowers

117. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 208–09; Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S.
41, 54 (1987); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985); see also supra
Part I.A.4 (describing remedies available under section 502(a)).
118. See Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 209; Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66.
119. See Lois A. Lofgren, Comment, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and
the Courts Provide a Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the
Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L. REV. 316, 318 (1993).
120. See STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 22
(2001); DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 4–5 (2d ed. 2004).
121. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 21; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 126 (1976).
122. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272–73
(Albany, John D. Parsons, Jr. 1877).
123. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 5; Richard A. Lord, The At-Will
Relationship in the 21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
707, 719 (2006).
124. Feinman, supra note 121, at 126; Bruce D. Berns, Note, Employers Beware: The
Implied Contract Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 28 B.C. L. REV. 327, 331
n.44 (1987).
125. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 22. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at
Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967).
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became increasingly recognized. 126 In 1959, California became the first
state to create an exception to the at-will employment doctrine for
whistleblowers. 127 The California District Court of Appeal held that public
policy dictated that an employer should not be permitted to discharge an
employee for truthfully disclosing information to a legislative body, rather
than lying to the body. 128 Today, most states recognize some form of
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine when an
employer terminates an employee for an activity, such as whistleblowing,
that “public policy would encourage,” 129 and many states have also enacted
statutes to protect whistleblowers.130
2. Different Types of Whistleblower Laws
Most statutes that protect whistleblowers do not specifically refer to or
define the term “whistleblower.”131 Instead, the statutes describe specific
conduct for which retaliation is prohibited.132 To determine whether
specific whistleblowing activity is protected, it is first necessary to
determine whether the employee is a public sector or private sector
employee. 133
The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) 134 protects federal
public sector employees who engage in whistleblowing activities.135
Congress passed the WPA in response to federal employees’ concerns that
whistleblower complaints were not being investigated promptly, and that
employees’ identities were being disclosed during the process.136 The
WPA sets deadlines for investigating whistleblower complaints and
prohibits disclosure of employees’ identities.137
Nearly all states provide some form of statutory protection for
whistleblowers. 138 The statutes differ on the extent of protection provided.
Some states protect all public sector employees, 139 while other states
protect only employees who perform specific types of work or who work at

126. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 22.
127. See Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959); KOHN, supra note 120, at 22–23.
128. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
129. KOHN, supra note 120, at 23.
130. Id. at 23–24; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 10–11.
131. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 22.
132. See id.
133. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 1–2.
134. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
135. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 99–104; see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note
120, at 62.
136. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 62.
137. See 5 U.S.C. § 1213 (2006); see also KOHN, supra note 120, at 100–02; WESTMAN &
MODESITT, supra note 120, at 62–63.
138. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 23; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 67, 78;
see also State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13390 (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
139. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.100 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1702–1703
(2005); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 67.
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specific levels of government. 140 Some states also provide statutory
protection to private sector employees. 141 Just as with public sector
statutes, these private sector protection statutes vary in the scope of
protection, with some providing protection to all private sector
employees, 142 and others only providing protection to employees who
engage in specific types of whistleblowing activities. 143 State courts have
also created common law exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine
that protect specific types of whistleblowing activities.144
Unlike the WPA, which covers all federal sector employees, there is no
single federal statute that protects all private sector whistleblowers.145
Instead, Congress included language in various statutes to protect specific
private sector whistleblower activity. 146 Each statute provides varying
levels of protection and each works in a different way. 147 For example,
employees are protected from employer retaliation if they report to the
Occupational Health and Safety Administration regarding workplace safety
issues that present imminent danger or physical harm. 148 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from terminating an
employee who opposes an employer’s discriminatory practices. 149 When
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, it not only prohibited
retaliation against Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers, but also made employer
retaliation a criminal offense punishable by up to ten years in prison.150 In
the recently passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Congress provided incentives for individuals who come
forward with “original” information to the Securities and Exchange

140. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-2703 (2008) (not protecting certain individuals and
entities); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-11-102 (2011) (protecting state employees who work more
than twenty hours per week); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 67.
141. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 77–79.
142. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 2011) (protecting any employee
who reports a violation of law to a public body); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 832–833
(2007); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 77–79.
143. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.60.089 (protecting individuals who report a violation
of a safety or health standard); S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-15-510 (1986) (protecting employees
who report health and safety violations); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at
77–79.
144. See, e.g., Brigham v. Dillon Cos., 935 P.2d 1054, 1060 (Kan. 1997) (recognizing a
public policy exception for wrongful demotion); Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704,
707 (Neb. 2007) (recognizing a public policy exception when an employee is terminated for
filing a workers’ compensation claim); Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25,
27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 95–96.
145. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 79–80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,
at 77–78.
146. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 78.
147. KOHN, supra note 120, at 80; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 88–92.
148. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657(f), 660(c) (2006); KOHN, supra note 120, at 94–95; WESTMAN
& MODESITT, supra note 120, at 90.
149. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); KOHN, supra note 120, at 83–86.
150. See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1107, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. III 2009)) (allowing for a maximum of ten years in prison for
retaliating against a whistleblower); see also STEPHEN M. KOHN ET AL., WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW: A GUIDE TO LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE EMPLOYEES 157–58 (2004).
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Commission. 151 These individuals are rewarded with a percentage of the
monetary sanctions resulting from the information they provided.152
3. Reporting a Violation: Internal vs. External Whistleblower Complaints
This section explains the different types of reporting mechanisms in
whistleblower protection acts, and discusses the different views that exist
over whether particular whistleblower activities deserve protection. This
section specifically focuses on two types of whistleblower activities. The
first is “internal” whistleblowing, where all the employee’s actions take
place within the organization,153 and the second is “external”
whistleblowing, where the employee makes a complaint outside of the
organization. 154
Internal whistleblowing is sometimes the best way for an employee to
report problems within an organization. 155 While an external disclosure can
harm the company’s reputation, cause the company to incur legal costs, and
cause a drop in the company’s stock price, 156 an internal complaint
typically gives the employer the opportunity to rectify any problems
without negative publicity and without absorbing heavy costs associated
with a public disclosure. 157 Employers can also deal with internal
complaints more quickly than complaints outside the organization. 158 An
internal complaint may result in less hardship for both the employee and the
employer. 159 Furthermore, most employees prefer to report the situation
internally. 160
If an employee’s internal report fails to convince the employer to fix any
problems, the employee may report the problem to an outside body or

151. See Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6).
152. See id.
153. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 23. This Note will discuss the conflict
over whether section 510 of ERISA protects internal whistleblower complaints in greater
detail in Part II.
154. Id.
155. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Melissa S. Baucus, Internal vs. External
Whistleblowers: A Comparison of Whistleblowering Processes, 17 J. BUS. ETHICS 1281,
1297 (1998); Kevin Rubinstein, Note, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section
806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 641–
42 (2007/08).
156. See Robert M. Bowen et al., Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and
Economic Consequences, 85 ACCT. REV. 1239, 1253–55 (2010).
157. Marcia P. Miceli et al., A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy Makers Can
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 380 (2009);
Rubinstein, supra note 155, at 641–42.
158. See Lilanthi Ravishankar, Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing in Organizations,
SANTA
CLARA
U.
(2003),
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/submitted/
whistleblowing.html.
159. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing:
Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J.
267, 300 (1991); Ravishankar, supra note 158.
160. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 17, at 61; Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 159, at
299–301.
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regulatory agency. 161 Employees who make complaints run the risk that
the employer may terminate them for making the complaint.162 Because
whistleblower protection does not always extend to internal whistleblowing,
an employee so terminated may have no remedy. 163
Commentators offer several rationales as to why no protection should be
offered to internal whistleblowers. One view is that because internal
whistleblowing is “non-adversarial,” it does not pose a threat to the
employer. 164 Thus, an employer is unlikely to retaliate against the
employee. 165 It is therefore unnecessary to provide protection to such
employees. 166 Yet another concern is that an employee might fabricate an
internal complaint to justify a retaliation claim. 167 This risk is lessened if
the employee is required to report formally to an administrative body. 168 A
further concern is the difficulty of proving that an employee was discharged
in retaliation for the complaint.169 For example, an employer may claim
that it did not terminate the employee because of the internal disclosure, but
because of an internal management dispute. 170
An additional rationale for not protecting internal whistleblowers lies in
the history of whistleblower law itself. 171 Courts originally created a public
policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment to provide
whistleblower protection to employees. 172 Unlike external disclosures,
internal disclosures do not bring public attention to any violations.173 Some
commentators assert that internal complaints are not deserving of protection
because without public knowledge, the public does not benefit.174 This
logic also helps to explain why some states’ whistleblower protection

161. See MICELI & NEAR, supra note 17, at 61; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,
at 48–49.
162. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 24.
163. See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of
Overlapping Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 446 (2009); see also infra Part II.
164. See Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237, 297 (2009).
165. See id. at 298.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. Cf. id. (“Limiting protection to external whistleblowers means that there will
ordinarily be an objective record of a report to an independent authority.”).
169. See Sarah M. Baum, Note, Callahan v. Edgewater Care & Rehabilitation Center:
The Illinois Whistleblower Act Does Not Preempt the Common Law Tort of Retaliatory
Discharge, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 161, 188 (2007).
170. See id.
171. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining creation of whistleblower laws).
172. See Alex B. Long, Viva State Employment Law! State Law Retaliation Claims in a
Post-Crawford/Burlington Northern World, 77 TENN. L. REV. 253, 292–93 (2010); Joseph C.
Telezinski, Jr., Comment, Without Warning—The Dangers of Protecting “Whistleblowers”
Who Don’t Blow the Whistle, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 417–18 (2000); see also supra Part
I.B.1.
173. See Long, supra note 172, at 293; Telezinski, supra note 172, at 418.
174. See Long, supra note 172, at 293; Telezinski, supra note 172, at 418.
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statutes protect only employees who report violations that impact public
health or public safety. 175
The public has held whistleblowers out as heroes for their work on
numerous occasions. 176 Whistleblowers often place their livelihoods at
great risk when they report, however. 177 A whistleblower who does not
come forward in the manner prescribed by the statute risks forfeiting the
statutory whistleblower protection. 178 Thus, whistleblowers should know
exactly what type of whistleblowing activity is protected before they make
a disclosure. 179
In states that provide protection to private sector whistleblowers, there is
no uniform rule regarding the type of complaint that triggers legal
protection. 180 Some states only protect external disclosures,181 some
protect internal and external disclosures,182 and some protect external
disclosures only if the employee first attempts an internal disclosure.183
C. An Overview of Section 510 of ERISA
This section reviews the background of section 510 of ERISA and the
protections that the statute provides to plan participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries.
Congress included section 510 in the original act passed in 1974184 in
response to concerns that employers might try to prevent an employee from
175. See Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Party
Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1970 (1996); see also supra notes 138–43 and accompanying
text.
176. See, e.g., Robert Trigaux, Top 10 Reasons Why Whistle-Blowers Are Heroes, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 15, 2002, http://www.sptimes.com/2002/02/15/Columns/
Top_10_reasons_why_wh.shtml; Time Names Whistleblowers as Persons of Year,
CNN.COM (Dec. 23, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-12-23/us/time.persons.of.year
_1_icy-river-whistleblowers-accounting-irregularities?_s=PM:US (noting that six out of ten
Americans view whistleblowers as heroes).
177. Lobel, supra note 163, at 486–87; see KOHN, supra note 120, at 21–23.
178. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 48–51.
179. See KOHN, supra note 120, at 1–3; WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,
at 41–42.
180. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 82–84.
181. See, e.g., 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 174/15 (West 2010) (only protecting
individuals who provide information externally); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.362 (West
2004) (only protecting employees who make an external report); see also WESTMAN &
MODESITT, supra note 120, at 83.
182. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1703 (2005) (protecting internal and external
disclosures); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-62 (West 2008) (protecting a whistleblower who
reports to an employer or to a public body); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120,
at 83.
183. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102 (West 2002) (protecting an employee who
discloses or “threaten[s] to disclose” information to an outside body so long as the employee
first gives the supervisor an opportunity to correct the activity); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2011) (requiring that the employee first notify a supervisor of a
violation before making an external disclosure); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52
(LexisNexis 2007) (requiring that an employee report to a supervisor before making an
external disclosure); see also WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 120, at 83.
184. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 510,
88 Stat. 829, 895 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2006)).

2011]

PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER

253

attaining benefits. 185 Senator Jacob K. Javits, one of the main sponsors of
ERISA, described section 510 as providing “a remedy for any person fired
such as is provided for a person discriminated against because of race or
sex.” 186 The House and Senate Reports on ERISA both state that Congress
intended that section 510 provide “broad remedies for redressing or
preventing violations” of ERISA. 187
Section 510 of ERISA can be broken down into three main parts. 188 The
first part makes it unlawful for any person to “discharge, fine, suspend,
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary” for
exercising any right to which the participant or beneficiary is entitled under
ERISA (the Exercise Clause). 189 The Exercise Clause is designed to
prevent an employer from terminating an employee because the employee
filed a claim for benefits, or brought litigation challenging a denial of
benefits. 190
The second part of section 510 makes it unlawful for a person to
“interfer[e] with the attainment” of any right to which the participant “may
become entitled” (the Interference Clause).191 Because Congress was
concerned that employers would fire employees just before they would vest
in a pension plan, 192 section 510 prohibits such activity. 193 Congress
included the Interference Clause to prevent an “unscrupulous employer[]”
from discharging an employee to prevent the employee from obtaining
vested benefits. 194 Because welfare benefits, in contrast to pension
benefits, do not vest, 195 there was initially a question of whether section
510 applied to welfare plans. 196 The Supreme Court settled this question

185. See 119 CONG. REC. 30,043–44 (1973).
186. Id. at 30,044.
187. H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655;
S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871.
188. In 2006, Congress amended section 510 to protect a “contributing employer” who
exercises rights under ERISA or who gives information or testifies in any “inquiry or
proceeding” relating to ERISA. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, § 205,
120 Stat. 780, 889 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140). This Note will not discuss this additional
protection.
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
190. See Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1285 (3d Cir. 1996); see also
ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note 90, at 922.
191. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
192. An employee who vests in a pension fund has a “non-forfeitable right to benefits
funded by employer contributions.” FAQs About ERISA, supra note 43; see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
193. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990); WIEDENBECK,
supra note 33, at 173.
194. See West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980); see also S. REP. NO. 93-127,
at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; ZANGLEIN & STABILE, supra note
90, at 922.
195. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2006) (exempting welfare plans from ERISA’s vesting
requirements).
196. Compare Shahid v. Ford Motor Co., 76 F.3d 1404, 1411 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that
section 510 is not limited to “benefits that will become vested”), and Heath v. Varity Corp.,
71 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that section 510 applies to both rights that are and
are not capable of vesting), with Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
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by holding that section 510 protects welfare plan benefits.197 Some courts
have also held that section 510 protects participants where the employer’s
action prevents them from obtaining increased benefits. 198
The third part of section 510—and the part most relevant to this Note—
makes it “unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has
testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating” to
ERISA. 199 For a claim based on section 510, an employee must
demonstrate that the employer discharged the employee with the specific
intent to interfere with the employee’s attainment of benefits.200 Courts
have determined that this provision bars an employer from terminating an
individual who testified about an ERISA-related matter in court or before
an administrative agency. 201 The question, however, is whether section 510
also applies when an employer terminates an individual for reporting
ERISA violations internally. 202 This conflict will be discussed further in
Part II of this Note.
Despite Congress’s intention to establish “broad remedies” under section
510, 203 there are several noticeable limits to its application. Section 510 is
enforced through the civil enforcement framework laid out in section
502. 204 Accordingly, the only individuals permitted to bring actions for
violations of section 510 are those listed in section 502, 205 and the only
remedies available are those provided in section 502.206
Section 510 may preempt state law wrongful discharge claims.207
Several circuits have held that ERISA can preempt state law even if ERISA
does not provide the remedy that the plaintiff seeks. 208 Thus, an employee
Fe Ry. Co., 80 F.3d 348, 351 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that section 510 only applies to rights
that are capable of vesting), vacated, 520 U.S. 510 (1997).
197. See Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520
U.S. 510, 512 (1997).
198. See, e.g., Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 89 F.3d 755, 759 (11th Cir. 1996);
Heath, 71 F.3d at 258; Conkwright v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 237 (4th
Cir. 1991).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
200. See, e.g., Bodine v. Emp’rs Cas. Co., 352 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2003); Salus v.
GTE Directories Serv. Corp., 104 F.3d 131, 135 (7th Cir. 1997); Barbour v. Dynamics
Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 1995).
201. See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); cf. Edwards v.
A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604
(2011).
202. See infra Part II.
203. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
204. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (“The provisions of [29 U.S.C. § 1132] shall be
applicable in the enforcement of this section.”); see also supra Part I.A.4 (describing
ERISA’s civil enforcement framework).
205. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
207. See supra Part I.A.5.
208. The Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that ERISA preempts state law even if
the particular remedy sought is unavailable under ERISA. See, e.g., Anderson v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408,
412 (9th Cir. 1993); Authier v. Ginsberg, 757 F.2d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1985).
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making a whistleblower complaint under the assumption that state law
protects the activity and provides an appropriate remedy may discover that
state law does not apply and that federal law does not provide the remedy
sought by the plaintiff. 209
II. PROTECTION OF INTERNAL COMPLAINTS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part II of this Note details the conflict between U.S. Courts of Appeals
over whether section 510 protects individuals who make internal complaints
about ERISA violations. While section 510 is clearly understood to protect
an employee who testifies before a court or gives information to a
regulatory body such as the Department of Labor, 210 it is less clear what
protection section 510 affords an employee who notifies an employer of
ERISA violations taking place within the company. First, this part details
the view of the Ninth and Fifth Circuits that section 510 protects unsolicited
internal complaints. Part II.B analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s view that
section 510 protects only formal external complaints. Part II.C discusses
the Second Circuit’s position that internal complaints are protected as long
as they are part of an “inquiry or proceeding.” Part II.D details the view of
the Third Circuit that section 510 does not protect unsolicited internal
complaints.
A. Unsolicited Internal Complaints Are Protected
1. The Ninth Circuit
In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, 211 the Ninth Circuit held that section
510 of ERISA protects employees who make unsolicited internal
complaints to employers about ERISA violations.212 Plaintiff Jessica
Hashimoto brought a lawsuit in Hawaii state court alleging that her
employer, the Bank of Hawaii, terminated her for complaining to her
supervisors about various ERISA violations. 213 This, she asserted, violated
Hawaii’s Whistleblowers Protection Act. 214 Hashimoto alleged that
Donald Feekin, an employee of the bank, improperly ordered her to
reimburse a former employee from a profit-sharing plan for taxes that had
been properly withheld from distribution. 215 She further alleged that Judith
Wetzel, another bank employee, ordered her to improperly “recalculate a

209. See David Angueira & David Conforto, Without a Remedy: The Massachusetts
Whistleblower’s Brush with ERISA, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 955, 956 (2006); Jessica
Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement of FLSA and ERISA
Is Thwarted by Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation and Remedies
Provisions, 58 UCLA L. REV. 521, 542 (2010).
210. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
211. 999 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1993).
212. See id. at 411.
213. See id. at 409–10.
214. See id. at 409.
215. See id. at 410.
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former employee’s pension plan benefit and to use final pay, not final
average pay.” 216
After the bank removed the case to federal court, the district court
granted summary judgment to the bank on the grounds that ERISA
preempted Hashimoto’s state law claim. 217 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
determined that section 510 provided protection to whistleblowers, and that
section 502(a) empowered Hashimoto to bring a cause of action for
relief. 218 The court determined ERISA’s preemption of state law was
“total” because the state law cause of action could be characterized as a
federal action. 219
To reach its determination, the court analyzed the specific language of
section 510. 220 Noting that section 510 protects an individual who gives
“information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or
proceeding” relating to ERISA, the court held that the statute was “clearly
meant to protect whistle blowers.” 221 As a result, the statute protects
employees like Hashimoto who are fired for protesting ERISA
violations. 222
To determine what type of “inquiry or proceeding” the statute protects
the court analyzed the process that an employee would be likely to take
when making a whistleblower complaint.223 The court reasoned that an
employee would normally notify an ERISA plan manager before going to
an outside agency like the Department of Labor. 224 If employers face no
consequence for discharging employees who initially complain to
management, the whole process would be cut off at the start.225 Thus,
allowing “anticipatory discharge discourages the whistle blower before the
whistle is blown.” 226
The court did not, however, reach the question of whether section 510
protects all employees and former employees who are terminated for
notifying management about ERISA violations.227 The court held only that
Hashimoto was entitled to bring an action under section 510 because
section 502(a) afforded her a cause of action as an ERISA fiduciary. 228
In McBride v. PLM International, Inc., 229 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether an employee who was terminated after engaging in whistleblower
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 411–12.
219. See id. at 412; see also supra Part I.A.5.
220. See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The court noted that it was possible that only individuals whom section 502
“empower[s] to bring a civil action” may bring an action based on section 510. See id.; see
also supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
229. 179 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1999).
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activity was entitled to bring a cause of action as a participant under
sections 510 and 502(a). 230 The court reaffirmed its holding in Hashimoto
that section 510 is “clearly meant to protect whistle blowers” and then
considered whether section 510 applied to a plan participant. 231 In
McBride, the court rejected the defendant’s assertion that McBride was no
longer a participant because the plan in issue had been terminated by the
time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.232 The court held that the status of the
individual making the complaint should be judged at the time the complaint
arises, not at the time that litigation commences. 233 The court noted that
the defendant’s interpretation would encourage employers to terminate
plans to avoid liability for section 510 violations.234 Thus, section 510
protects participants who engage in whistleblowing activity. 235
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit was the next circuit to consider section 510’s reach. In
Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 236 the Fifth Circuit determined
that section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints. 237
Plaintiff George Anderson initially brought state common law claims
against Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in Texas state court asserting,
among other claims, wrongful discharge. 238 Anderson alleged that another
employee at EDS had asked him to approve payment invoices for funds
retained by another employee without approval of the pension fund’s board
of trustees, and to write up minutes for meetings that he did not attend, both
violations of ERISA. 239 Anderson claimed that EDS terminated him after
he refused to commit the acts and reported the other employee’s conduct to
management. 240 EDS removed the case to federal district court, which
granted summary judgment to EDS on the wrongful discharge claim.241
Anderson appealed, claiming that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and seeking a remand to state court on the wrongful discharge
claim. 242
The Fifth Circuit, noting that Anderson had never asserted a federal cause
of action, analyzed whether ERISA preemption allowed for removal to
230. Id. at 740–41.
231. Id. at 742.
232. See id. at 743–44.
233. See id. at 743.
234. See id. at 746.
235. See id. at 743.
236. 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994).
237. See id. at 1314.
238. See id. at 1312.
239. See id. at 1312–13.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 1313.
242. See id. Anderson sought to keep the case out of federal court by deleting all
references to ERISA from his complaint. See id. The court held that deleting the references
did not alter the fact that the action depended on the existence of an ERISA plan and was
thus preempted by ERISA. See id. at 1314; see also supra Part I.A.5 (explaining ERISA
preemption).

258

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

federal court. 243 The court first considered whether ERISA preempted
Anderson’s state law claims. 244 The court followed the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon. 245 In McClendon, the
Supreme Court had held that ERISA preempted a state law wrongful
discharge claim because the claim did not just involve an ERISA plan, but
depended on the “existence” of an ERISA plan, 246 and because the state
claim would conflict with the enforcement provisions provided by ERISA
sections 502 and 510. 247 The Fifth Circuit determined that Anderson’s
claim depended on the existence of an ERISA plan because it was based on
his refusal to commit ERISA violations and his reporting the violations to
management. 248 Additionally, Anderson’s claim fell “squarely within the
ambit” of section 510.249 Thus, the court concluded that ERISA preempts a
state wrongful discharge claim for “refusal to commit [ERISA violations]
and for reporting such violations to management.” 250
The court next considered whether the federal court had subject matter
jurisdiction over Anderson’s state law wrongful discharge claim. 251 The
court applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning from Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Taylor. 252 In Taylor, the Supreme Court had held that a
cause of action that falls within the scope of section 502(a) is completely
preempted by ERISA and subject to removal. 253 Section 502 enforces
section 510, which “broadly prohibits” an employer from terminating
participants and beneficiaries for giving information or testimony relating to
ERISA. 254 Thus, the federal court had subject matter jurisdiction because
Anderson’s claim fell within the enforcement provisions provided by
section 502(a). 255
The court noted that the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota
reached the same conclusion in McLean v. Carlson Cos. 256 In McLean, the
district court determined that a plaintiff who was discharged for making an
internal complaint had standing to bring an action under section 502(a).257
The district court reasoned that it made no sense to permit a participant to

243. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1313.
244. See id. at 1313–14.
245. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
246. See id. at 140.
247. See id. at 144.
248. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. Id. at 1315. The court noted that preemption does not end the court’s analysis
because preemption is a defense and “federal question jurisdiction is determined by the wellpleaded complaint rule.” Id.; see supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (detailing how
ERISA completely preempts state law claims where the claim could have been brought
under section 502(a)).
252. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
253. Id. at 66–67.
254. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); supra Part I.C.
255. See Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315.
256. 777 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Minn. 1991); see Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 n.5.
257. See McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1484.
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seek an injunction under that provision while at the same time denying a
remedy to a participant who was terminated for complaining internally. 258
B. The Fourth Circuit: Section 510 Protects Only Formal Complaints
In King v. Marriott International, Inc.,259 the Fourth Circuit held that
section 510 protects only “formal” disclosures. 260 Plaintiff Karen King
brought a state law wrongful discharge claim asserting that she was
terminated for complaining about, and refusing to commit, ERISA
violations. 261 King alleged that in late 1998 or early 1999 Karl Fredericks,
Marriott’s Senior Vice President of Compensation and Benefits,
recommended that “Marriott transfer millions of dollars from its medical
plan into its general corporate reserve account.”262 King expressed concern
about this transaction. 263 In late 1999, Fredericks promoted King and gave
her certain responsibilities over benefit plan finances.264 After her
promotion, King learned that the transfer of assets to the reserve fund was
under consideration once again. 265 Concerned that this transaction would
violate ERISA, King notified Fredericks that she objected to the transaction
and requested an opinion letter from an in-house attorney. 266 In September
1999, Fredericks restructured the benefits department and again promoted
King, this time to Vice President of Benefits Resources. 267 In early 2000,
Marriott proposed, and King objected to, another reserve fund transfer.268
Fredericks fired King shortly thereafter. 269
King filed an action in Maryland state court claiming her termination
violated public policy and was thus actionable under Maryland’s public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. 270 Marriott removed
the case to federal court on the ground that section 510 of ERISA
preempted the state law wrongful discharge claim. 271 After it denied
King’s motion to remand the case to state court, the district court granted
Marriott summary judgment on all claims. 272
The Fourth Circuit, in reviewing the lower court’s denial of King’s
motion to remand, considered whether section 510 preempted her state law
258. See id.
259. 337 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2003).
260. See id. at 427.
261. See id. at 423.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id. When Fredericks reorganized the benefits fund department, he placed King and
another employee in charge of the benefits fund department. Id. King and the other
employee feuded over the division of responsibilities, and Fredericks claimed that they were
both terminated over the feud. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 423–24.
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whistleblower complaint. 273 The circuit court analyzed the language of
section 510 to determine whether it applied to unsolicited internal
complaints. 274 In doing so, the court focused on the meaning of the phrase
“inquiry or proceeding,” and looked to its interpretation of a similar
provision in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 275 The FLSA’s
whistleblower protection statute prohibits an employer from terminating an
employee who has “filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be
instituted any proceeding under or related to [the FLSA], or has testified or
is about to testify in any such proceeding.” 276 In Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q
Co., 277 the Fourth Circuit held that “proceedings” under the FLSA are
“procedures conducted in judicial or administrative tribunals.”278 The court
also held that “the term ‘instituted’ connotes” a level of formality that is not
reached by making an “oral complaint to [a] supervisor.” 279 Thus, the court
in Ball determined that Congress intended in the FLSA to protect only those
employees who testify after “formal” proceedings begin, and did not intend
the FLSA to protect employees who complain internally to their
supervisors. 280
In King, the Fourth Circuit noted that section 510, like the FLSA
provision, includes the phrase “testified or is about to testify.” 281 The court
concluded that this language suggests that section 510’s reference to
“inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]” applies to “legal or administrative”
proceedings, or at the very least, “something more formal than written or
oral complaints to a supervisor.” 282 Relying on this interpretation, the court
found that section 510 did not protect King because she filed only internal
complaints with her supervisors, and did not testify or give information in
what the Fourth Circuit viewed as an “inquiry or proceeding.” 283
The court found the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Hashimoto and the Fifth
Circuit’s holding in Anderson “unpersuasive.” 284 The Fourth Circuit
criticized Hashimoto as driven by policy, rather than any statutory
analysis. 285 The court noted that the language of section 510 is clear and
thus could not be “fairly construed” to extend to internal complaints, even if
policy concerns dictated otherwise.286
Because section 510 did not protect King, her state law claim could not
be re-categorized as a federal claim under ERISA. 287 As a result, removal
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id. at 426–28.
See id.
See id. at 427.
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006).
228 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 364.
Id.
Id.
King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 427–28.
Id. at 428; see supra Part II.A (discussing the holdings in Hashimoto and Anderson).
See King, 337 F.3d at 428 & n.4.
See id. at 428.
Id.; see supra Part I.A.5 (discussing ERISA preemption).
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to federal court was incorrect and the court remanded the case to state court
for further proceedings. 288
C. The Second Circuit’s Middle Ground
In Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 289 the Second Circuit took a middle
ground regarding section 510’s reach. 290 While the court stopped short of
holding that section 510 protects all internal complaints, the court found
that section 510 protects internal complaints that are made as part of an
ongoing “inquiry or proceeding.” 291
Plaintiff Chrystina Nicolaou served as a fiduciary and trustee of Horizon
Media’s 401(k) plan. 292 In 1998, shortly after she began work at Horizon,
Nicolaou discovered a “payroll discrepancy involving underpayment of
Nicolaou determined that this
overtime” to certain employees.293
discrepancy was causing an underfunding of the 401(k) plan. 294 She
informed multiple supervisors at Horizon of her concerns, and they told her
to ignore the problem. 295 Nicolaou then contacted Mark Silverman, an
attorney for Horizon, and asked him to look into the issue.296 After
performing his own investigation, Silverman confirmed Nicolaou’s
claims. 297 Nicolaou and Silverman then met with William Koenigsberg,
the President of Horizon Media, and discussed the problem. 298 Shortly
after the meeting, Nicolaou was demoted from her position as Director of
Human Resources, and was ultimately terminated in November 2000.299
Nicolaou brought an action under section 510 claiming that Horizon
wrongfully demoted and terminated her.300 The district court dismissed her
claim, holding that section 510 did not protect her because she was
participating in an internal inquiry. 301 Just as the Fourth Circuit in King
relied on its prior interpretation of the FLSA, 302 the district court relied on
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the FLSA in Lambert v. Genesee

288. King, 337 F.3d at 428. After remand, King argued that her termination was in
violation of public policy and should thus be protected by Maryland’s public policy
exception to the at-will employment doctrine. See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 866 A.2d 895,
903 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005). The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland rejected this
argument, finding that King’s discharge did not violate public policy. See id. at 906.
289. 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005).
290. See id. at 330.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 326.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 326–27.
300. Id. at 327.
301. Id.
302. See supra Part II.B.
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Hospital, 303 where the Second Circuit had held that the FLSA
whistleblower provision applied only to formal complaints. 304
In reviewing the district court’s dismissal, the Second Circuit concluded
that Lambert was not controlling because section 510’s plain language is
“unambiguously broader” than the language of its FLSA counterpart.305
The court noted that while the FLSA extends protection to anyone who “has
filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding
under or related to” the FLSA, section 510 applies to “any inquiry or
proceeding” related to ERISA. 306 While a “proceeding” refers to the
“progression of a lawsuit or other business before a court,” 307 an “inquiry”
refers to a “request for information.” 308 The court reasoned that Congress
intended to protect the “informal gathering of information” by extending
section 510’s protection to “any inquiry.” 309
The court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
Nicolaou was actually taking part in an inquiry or proceeding at the time the
alleged retaliation occurred. 310 The court noted, however, that section 510
would protect Nicolaou if she could demonstrate that the purpose of her
meeting with Koenigsberg was to discuss the plan’s underfunding. 311
The Second Circuit distinguished its holding from the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in King. 312 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, which held that section 510
only protects formal, external complaints, the Second Circuit stated that the
court’s focus should not be on the “formality or informality of the
circumstances under which an individual gives information,” but rather, on
whether an inquiry is taking place when the individual gives information.313
Because Nicolaou’s meeting with Koenigsberg could potentially be
construed as part of an inquiry, Nicolaou had asserted an actionable claim
under section 510. 314
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosemary Pooler asserted that the
majority decision did not extend the protections of section 510 far
enough. 315 Judge Pooler argued that the court should have focused on
303. 10 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 1993).
304. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328 (citing Lambert, 10 F.3d at 55).
305. Id.
306. See id. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006), with id. § 1140.
307. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 329 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed.
2004); WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1807 (1993)).
308. See id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (8th ed. 2004); WEBSTER’S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1167 (1993)).
309. See id. at 328–29.
310. Id. at 330.
311. See id. Although the court on remand determined that Nicolaou was participating in
an “inquiry” when she was terminated, it still granted summary judgment to Horizon Media
because Nicolaou could not establish that Horizon terminated her as a result of her
participation in the inquiry. See Order at 17–20, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media Inc., No. 01 Civ.
0785 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2008), ECF No. 71.
312. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; see also supra Part II.B (describing the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in King).
313. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330.
314. Id.
315. See id. at 330 (Pooler, J., concurring).
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Nicolaou’s status as an ERISA fiduciary. 316 She reviewed the duties of an
ERISA fiduciary and argued that fiduciaries should be protected when they
perform their own investigations.317
Judge Pooler noted that restricting section 510’s protections to formal
external inquiries would leave fiduciaries few options to deal with potential
breaches. 318 A fiduciary could take no action and potentially face personal
liability under sections 405 and 409.319 In the alternative, the fiduciary
could notify a superior and face the prospect of retaliation,320 or the
fiduciary could inform a regulatory agency and hope that the superiors did
not find out about this until after the agency began its own inquiry.321
Lastly, the fiduciary could bring a civil action under section 502(a)(3) to
enjoin the illegal actions.322 Judge Pooler posited that “ERISA’s framers
[did not] intend[] to place fiduciaries in such an unenviable position.”323
Instead, she asserted that it was logical to infer that if a fiduciary has the
right to sue to prevent ERISA violations, the fiduciary has a right to inform
the plan administrator of such violations without fear of retaliation.324
Judge Pooler argued that as a fiduciary, Nicolaou should have been
protected from the moment she began investigating the plan’s funding
problems, not merely because she met with Koenigsberg. 325 Judge Pooler
asserted that if fiduciaries are not provided with such protection, they might
be discouraged from vigorously carrying out their duties. 326
D. The Third Circuit: Section 510 Does Not Protect
Unsolicited Internal Complaints
The Third Circuit is the most recent circuit to consider the question of
whether section 510 extends to internal complaints. In Edwards v. A.H.
Cornell & Son, Inc., 327 plaintiff Shirley Edwards claimed that her employer
terminated her after she complained to management about ERISA
violations. 328 Edwards was the Director of Human Resources at A.H.
Cornell, as well as a participant in the company’s group health plan.329
Edwards discovered that A.H. Cornell was “administering the group health
plan on a discriminatory basis, misrepresenting to . . . employees the cost of
group health coverage in an effort to dissuade employees from opting into

316. See id. at 330–31.
317. See id. at 330–32.
318. See id. at 331.
319. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.3 (describing ERISA fiduciary liability).
320. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 331 (Pooler, J., concurring).
321. See id.
322. See id.; see also supra Part I.A.4 (describing ERISA’s civil enforcement
framework).
323. Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 332 (Pooler, J., concurring).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011).
328. Id. at 218.
329. Id.
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benefits, and enrolling non-citizens in its ERISA plans.” 330 Edwards
objected to company management about these practices and was terminated
shortly thereafter.331 She then brought an action claiming that A.H. Cornell
violated section 510 of ERISA. 332 The district court, relying on the Second
Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou, dismissed Edwards’ complaint, holding that
no one requested any information from Edwards and thus she was not
participating in an “inquiry or proceeding” at the time of her termination.333
On review, the Third Circuit held that section 510 does not protect
unsolicited internal complaints.334
The court first analyzed the plain language of section 510 to determine
the meaning of the word “inquiry” as used in the statute. 335 The Secretary
of Labor argued in its amicus brief that an unsolicited internal complaint to
management should be considered part of an “inquiry or proceeding”
because an informal inquiry is often the first step before a more formal
inquiry is commenced. 336 The court rejected the Secretary’s argument,
noting that Black’s Law Dictionary defines an inquiry as a “request for
information.” 337 Because Edwards’s complaints and objections were
unsolicited, she was not responding to a request for information. 338 The
court also rejected Edwards’s argument that her objections and complaints
constituted an “inquiry.” 339 The court reasoned that because the statute
only protects employees who “give[] information” and not employees who
“receive[] information,” the term “inquiry” only refers to “inquiries made of
an employee, not inquires made by an employee.” 340
The court found the holdings in Hashimoto and Anderson unpersuasive
because they did not closely examine the statutory language. 341 Instead, the
court agreed with the Fourth Circuit’s holding in King that the statutory
language limited section 510’s protections to “more formal actions.”342
The court noted that its prior interpretations of the FLSA should not control
its interpretation of section 510 because the statutes are “not identical.”343
The court compared the text of section 510 to that of other anti-retaliation
statutes and found that not all anti-retaliation statutes are limited to “more
330. Id. at 219.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 218.
335. See id. at 222–24.
336. See id. at 222–23 (citing Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant for Reversal at 16, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (No. 09-3198), 2009 WL
6870704, at *24).
337. Id. at 223 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (9th ed. 2009)).
338. See id.
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit in Anderson only “gave the issue
cursory treatment,” and the Ninth Circuit focused on a “fair interpretation” rather than the
statutory text. See id.
342. See id. The court did not address the level of formality required to constitute an
inquiry. See id. at 223 n.7.
343. See id. at 224.
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formal actions.” 344 The court specifically noted that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision contains broader language than section 510, thus
demonstrating that Congress explicitly provides broader protection to
employees in other circumstances.345
Edwards and the Secretary of Labor argued that the court should read
section 510 broadly because ERISA is a remedial statute.346 The Third
Circuit rejected this argument.347 Although the court acknowledged that
ERISA provisions should be “liberally construed” when the statutory text is
ambiguous, here the plain meaning of section 510 was “unambiguous,” and
thus the court would not liberally construe the statute.348 The court rejected
the argument that the failure to protect unsolicited internal complaints
would undermine section 510, asserting that Congress could have worded
the statute differently if it was concerned about the lack of protection. 349
Judge Robert Cowen dissented from the court’s holding, arguing that
section 510 protects “unsolicited internal complaints to management.”350
He disagreed with the majority’s characterization of section 510’s statutory
language as unambiguous. 351 Judge Cowen noted that Congress viewed
section 510 as essential to ERISA because “‘without it, employers would be
able to circumvent the provision of promised benefits.’” 352 He argued that
Congress could not have intended to deny protection to employees who
notify their employer about ERISA violations.353
Judge Cowen criticized the majority for narrowly interpreting the term
“inquiry.” 354 He noted that the court at times seemed to adopt the holding
from King that only external complaints are protected, and at other times
seemed to adopt the holding from Nicolaou that section 510 protects
employees only after an internal investigation commences. 355 Judge
Cowen specifically criticized the Second Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou as
“unworkable in certain circumstances.” 356 He explained that an employee
could complain to a supervisor about ERISA violations, and the supervisor
344. See id. at 223.
345. See id. The court specifically noted that, unlike section 510, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision provides protection to an employee who “‘oppose[s] any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)).
346. See id.; see also Brief of Appellant at 9–10, Edwards, 610 F.3d 217 (No. 09-3198),
2009 WL 6870703, at *9–10; Brief for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 336, at 16; cf.
Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Kross v. W.
Electric Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1242–43 (7th Cir. 1983).
347. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223.
348. See id. at 223–24; cf. Wolk v. UNUM Life Ins. of Am., 186 F.3d 352, 356 (3d Cir.
1999).
349. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224.
350. Id. at 226 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
351. Id.
352. See id. at 226–27 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143
(1990)).
353. See id. at 227.
354. See id. at 227–28.
355. See id. at 227.
356. Id.
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could respond by asking the employee follow up questions. 357 Judge
Cowen asked whether section 510 protects an employee who responds to
the supervisor’s follow-up questions. 358 He reasoned that if section 510
does not protect the employee, the supervisor would have an incentive to
terminate the employee instead of conducting an investigation into the
allegations. 359
Judge Cowen also took issue with the majority’s holding that section 510
protects only individuals who give information, and not those individuals
who receive information. 360 He argued that the court’s failure to protect
individuals who conduct inquiries would leave a whole group of employees
unprotected. 361 Employees who conduct investigations into ERISA
violations need protection more than employees who simply answer
questions from supervisors. 362 Judge Cowen concluded his dissent by
arguing that analogous Third Circuit precedent interpreting other antiretaliation statutes demonstrates that section 510 is ambiguous and thus
should be given a broad interpretation. 363
The extent of section 510’s protections within the Third Circuit is still
unsettled. As Judge Cowen noted, certain parts of Edwards seem to adopt
the Fourth Circuit’s holding in King that only formal external complaints
are protected, while at other times it appears to agree with the position taken
by the Second Circuit in Nicolaou. 364 Judge Jan E. DuBois of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently ruled that
Edwards holds only that section 510 does not protect “unsolicited internal
complaints,” and that section 510 “unambiguously” protects solicited
internal complaints. 365 Such a ruling appears in conflict with the Fourth
Circuit’s holding in King that section 510 protects only employees who give
information in a “legal or administrative” setting. 366
III. SECTION 510 OF ERISA SHOULD PROTECT INTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWERS IN CERTAIN INSTANCES
Part III of this Note considers the reach of section 510 of ERISA. This
part first considers whether the statutory text is ambiguous and thus whether
a broad reading of the statute is available. Next, it analyzes whether policy
concerns dictate that section 510 protect internal complaints. It considers
what steps an ERISA fiduciary must take to obtain protection under section
510. It then analyzes the circumstances under which section 510 protects a
participant or beneficiary. This part concludes by considering what
357. See id. at 228.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. See id.
361. See id.
362. See id.
363. See id. at 228–29.
364. See id. at 227; see also supra Part II.B–C.
365. See Garson v. HVAC Corp., No. 10-1612, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119186, at *8–9
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2010).
366. See supra Part II.B.
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recourse section 510 provides an individual who is not a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary, and proposes an amendment to ERISA to ensure
protection for all ERISA whistleblowers.
A. Section 510’s Language Is Ambiguous
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s holding, 367 the language of section 510
is ambiguous. The Fourth Circuit’s decision in King, that section 510
protects only formal external complaints, was based on the court’s
comparison of ERISA and the FLSA. 368 But the FLSA whistleblower
provision protects employees only when they give information in a
“proceeding,” in contrast to ERISA, which protects employees participating
in an “inquiry” or a “proceeding.”369 In Nicolaou and Edwards, both the
Second and Third Circuits determined that their prior interpretations of the
FLSA statute did not control their interpretation of section 510.370 The
disagreement between the circuits on section 510’s reach demonstrates the
ambiguity in the statute’s construction. 371 Judge Cowen is correct that the
wording of the statute is ambiguous and that, because ERISA is a remedial
statute, section 510 deserves as broad a reading as possible. 372
B. The Necessity of Providing Internal ERISA Whistleblowers
Broad Protections
Before further considering section 510’s reach, it is necessary to consider
whether individuals who make either solicited or unsolicited internal
complaints should be protected as a matter of public policy. Some
commentators and courts have asserted that internal whistleblower
complaints should not be protected because they do not further “public
policy.” 373 But protecting internal complaints about ERISA violations does
advance public policy goals.
First, by passing ERISA, Congress
specifically determined that protecting private benefit funds is an area of
federal concern. 374 Defined benefit pension fund finances are also a public
concern. If a violation is publicly disclosed, the employer may suffer
public relations damage. 375 The damage from the disclosure could
financially harm the company, 376 which could compromise the employer’s
ability to fulfill its obligations to the pension fund. The PBGC may be
required to take control of the fund if it fails. 377 Given concerns about the
PBGC’s finances in recent years, 378 it is in the public’s interest that
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006), with id. § 1140.
See supra Part II.C–D.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 350–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171–75 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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companies deal with complaints internally rather than in public where they
could adversely affect the company. 379 A public disclosure might also
affect the company’s stock price. 380 A drop in stock price may harm the
company’s shareholders, which may include employees who own company
stock through employee stock ownership plans.381
Most importantly, because whistleblowers prefer to report internally, 382
they are less likely to report violations if they are required to go outside the
organization to make the report. In such cases, it is possible that no one
will find out about the problem until the situation becomes dire.383 If
individuals like Chrystina Nicolaou who discover problems with plan
funding are discouraged from reporting violations, there is a possibility that
no one will find out about the situation until the plan is unable to fulfill its
payment obligations. 384
Protecting internal disclosures is consistent with ERISA’s goal of
providing federal regulation of private plans while still maintaining private
control. 385 Forcing employees to report externally undermines this goal
because it takes the ability to remedy the situation out of the company’s
hands.
C. Who Section 510 Protects
1. A Proposed Standard for ERISA Fiduciaries
ERISA imposes on fiduciaries an extremely high standard of conduct,386
and a fiduciary who does not adhere to that standard may be held personally
liable. 387 ERISA fiduciaries who discover ERISA violations have a duty to
remedy those violations. 388 Section 510 must protect a fiduciary whenever
he or she provides information to a supervisor about an ERISA violation.
Accordingly, section 510 should be read broadly to prohibit an employer
from terminating a fiduciary for expressing concerns about potential ERISA
violations.
To understand the rationale for broadly interpreting section 510, it is
important to consider the circumstances under which a fiduciary might find
it necessary to make an internal complaint. First, ERISA requires a
fiduciary who discovers that a co-fiduciary is violating ERISA to take steps
to remedy the violations.389 In some cases, this may require that the
fiduciary notify a supervisor to remedy the breach.390 If section 510 does
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.

See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text.
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2011]

PROTECTING THE ERISA WHISTLEBLOWER

269

not protect this fiduciary, he or she would be forced to risk his or her
livelihood to remedy the violations.391 Although the fiduciary could bring a
civil action under section 502(a)(3) to stop the violations, 392 this might not
be the best way to remedy the breach. For example, a violation may need to
be dealt with quickly, and the only way for the fiduciary to do that might be
to notify a supervisor. Further, a fiduciary who chooses not to report the
violation to a supervisor out of fear of retaliation may violate the statutory
duty to act in the exclusive interests of plan participants and
beneficiaries. 393 In that case, the fiduciary could face liability under section
409. 394
A second situation to consider is whether a fiduciary is protected if he or
she reports to management that a participant or beneficiary has notified the
fiduciary about an ERISA violation.
In that case, the fiduciary
responsibility standards seem to require that the fiduciary at least
investigate the concerns. 395
Finally, ERISA requires fiduciaries to disclose information to plan
participants in certain situations, 396 and some courts have extended this
duty to instances where a company considers plan changes that may affect
participants’ retirement decisions.397 Because this disclosure is required
whether or not supervisors at the company want to disclose the
information, 398 it seems logical that ERISA should protect a fiduciary who
discloses the information against the employer’s wishes. Similarly, ERISA
should protect a fiduciary who is attempting to prevent ERISA violations,
even if this attempt is against the employer’s wishes.
Under the Ninth and Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, section
510 protects the fiduciary in almost all of the above scenarios.399 The
Second, Third, and Fourth Circuit interpretations, however, leave
fiduciaries unprotected in a variety of instances.400 The Fourth Circuit’s
holding that section 510 only protects “formal” inquiries in a “legal or
administrative” setting does not appear to protect a fiduciary in any of the
situations discussed above. 401 The Second Circuit interpretation is
problematic because it grants protection only when an inquiry is actually
taking place, and a court may determine that a fiduciary performing his or
her own investigation is not actually conducting an “inquiry.”402 The Third
391. See supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
392. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2006); supra note 95 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
398. See supra Part I.A.3.
399. See Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994);
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993); see also supra Part II.A.
400. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir.
2005); King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 428 (4th Cir. 2003); supra Part II.B–D.
401. See King, 337 F.3d at 428; supra Part II.B.
402. See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330; supra Part II.C.
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Circuit standard suffers from both of the faults contained in the Second and
Fourth Circuits’ interpretations. 403
Judge Pooler correctly noted in her concurring opinion in Nicolaou that
ERISA fiduciary responsibility is undermined if no protection is afforded to
ERISA fiduciaries who express concerns internally. 404 Any other reading
is inconsistent with ERISA fiduciary conduct standards, 405 and would
hamper a fiduciary’s ability to remedy violations. If employers face no
consequences for dismissing fiduciaries who express concerns about
ERISA violations, fiduciaries will hesitate to investigate the violations.
Such a result will be detrimental to plan participants and beneficiaries, and
potentially the public, and would be inconsistent with the general goals of
ERISA. 406
2. Participants and Beneficiaries
The next step is to determine what type of protection a participant or
beneficiary should be entitled to if terminated for notifying his or her
employer about potential ERISA violations.
One of the key goals of ERISA is to protect the benefits of participants
and beneficiaries. 407 ERISA’s protections were specifically designed with
events such as the Studebaker pension shortfall in mind. 408 It is consistent
with this protective purpose to encourage participants and beneficiaries to
express concerns they may have about the plan. They should feel free to do
so without fear of retaliation.
Unlike fiduciaries, participants and beneficiaries are not engaging in any
inquiry when going about their daily routines, as they have no statutory
obligation to correct ERISA violations. 409 Thus, it must be determined
what conduct by a participant or beneficiary constitutes an “inquiry or
proceeding.”
Section 510 should be interpreted to protect a participant or beneficiary
who notifies an ERISA fiduciary in writing about an ERISA violation.
Section 510 expressly protects individuals who “give[] information.”410
Because a fiduciary has a duty to investigate the alleged misconduct,411 it
seems logical that providing written notice to a fiduciary should constitute
the beginning of the inquiry. Requiring that the complaint be in writing
will circumvent any later claim that the complaint was never actually
filed. 412
403. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223; supra Part II.D.
404. See supra notes 315–26 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 63–69 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 315–26 and
accompanying text.
406. See supra Part I.A.1–2.
407. See supra Part I.A.1–2.
408. See supra Part I.A.1.
409. See supra Part I.C.
410. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006); supra Part I.C.
411. See supra notes 79–87 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about employees
fabricating complaints to justify retaliation claims).
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3. Individuals who Are Not Participants, Beneficiaries, or Fiduciaries
Section 510 specifically prohibits an employer from discharging “any
person” who gives information about an inquiry or proceeding relating to
ERISA, 413 and ERISA defines a “person” as an “individual.” 414
Unfortunately, section 502(a), the enforcement mechanism for section 510,
does not provide a right of action for an individual who is not a participant,
beneficiary, or fiduciary. 415 Because courts treat the list of plaintiffs in
section 502(a) as exhaustive, an individual who is a company employee but
not a participant or beneficiary in the ERISA plan, or a plan fiduciary, has
no standing to assert a claim under sections 510 and 502(a). 416 This lack of
protection applies to external and internal whistleblowers.
The individual can look to state law for relief, but that may be
problematic because of preemption.417 A state court may determine that
ERISA preempts any state law claim on the issue even though ERISA
provides no remedy. 418 Even if ERISA does not preempt a state law claim
on the issue, the individual may not be able to obtain a remedy because of
the hodgepodge of state laws protecting whistleblowers.419 Thus, such an
individual may find protection in one state but not in another.420
There is a strong policy argument that ERISA should protect those
whistleblowers who cannot bring an action under section 502(a). These
whistleblowers may place their careers and livelihoods in jeopardy by
blowing the whistle on ERISA violations.421 They are only seeking to help
others, as they have nothing to gain in ensuring that the violations are
corrected.
They have no rights to benefits like participants and
beneficiaries, 422 and they cannot be held personally liable like
fiduciaries. 423 They are also helping the company by disclosing the
problems internally as opposed to externally. 424 Finally, if the protection of
employee benefits is truly a federal concern, then it follows that federal law
should provide protection to individuals who seek to remedy ERISA
violations, whether or not they are participants in the plan.
D. A Legislative Solution to the Conflict
Congress should amend ERISA to specifically provide protection to
internal whistleblowers, and to protect all individuals who report ERISA
violations. Such an amendment would have two key components.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
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First, section 510 should be amended to specifically protect internal
whistleblowers. This can be accomplished by rewording the language of
the statute to protect any person who gives information “internally or
externally” or testifies or is about to testify in any “internal or external”
inquiry or proceeding relating to ERISA. Such language clarifies that the
statute’s protections extend beyond formal external complaints.
Second, section 502(a) should be amended to provide a cause of action to
an individual who is not a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, and who is
terminated for reporting ERISA violations. Congress should add a new
subsection to the statute permitting a cause of action “by any person for
appropriate equitable relief in the case of a violation of” section 510. This
amendment would provide a cause of action under ERISA to anyone
terminated for reporting a violation, regardless of the individual’s status in
relation to the plan. 425
CONCLUSION
It is important that ERISA protect all individuals who report ERISA
violations. The extent of protection should not depend on whether the
report is made internally or externally. As this Note discussed, protecting
merely external complaints not only conflicts with ERISA’s aims and goals,
but is also harmful to the very individuals ERISA is designed to protect.
Section 510 should protect all individuals who make complaints internally.
This Note offers a solution to the conflict surrounding section 510’s reach.
It proposes an interpretation of ERISA that furthers the statute’s aims and
goals while protecting whistleblowers, and also proposes an amendment to
ERISA that expands this protection. This approach will help to ensure the
protection of important employee benefits.

425. See supra Part I.B.2.

